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Descartes, René (1596–1650) 
 
Mathematician and founder of modern philosophy, known for 
his distrust of formal rhetoric. The Cartesian method and effort 
to achieve philosophic certainty are often cited as a challenge to 
rhetoric; yet, given Descartes's frequent deployment of rhetorical 
strategies, it is not surprising that his system makes provision for 
their provisional use. Furthermore, in spite of Descartes's aspira-
tion toward a philosophy beyond rhetoric, postmodern critics 
find his system an entirely rhetorical construct. 
In Part One of the Discourse on Method, Descartes deni-
grates the utility of formal rhetoric for persuasion, maintaining 
that clear and distinct ideas suffice. His claim to construct a new 
philosophic system ignoring previous ones implicitly questions 
the usefulness of the rhetorical tradition. Proclaiming the unity 
of all knowledge, he advocated a single method drawing its uni-
versal validity not from the specificity of individual disciplines 
but from the processes of the human mind. Moreover, his adop-
tion of a mathematical model and his aspiration to extend math-
ematical certainty to all domains caused him to reject the prob-
abilities that had been accepted in rhetoric. His dualism, which 
assigned highest value to ideas known independently of the 
senses, led to a distrust of the imagination and passions. 
Indeed, the traditional five parts of rhetoric are almost en-
tirely displaced by the four rules of the Discourse. If only clear 
and distinct ideas persuade, convincing arguments are discov-
ered by his method rather than by such technics as the com-
monplaces. Disposition should sequence ideas from simple to 
more complex, either in the "analytic" manner by which they 
were discovered, or in the "synthetic" one that arranges them as 
a sequence of axioms and definitions that makes clear how each 
successive proposition follows logically from the preceding one. 
These clear and distinct ideas should be communicated through 
a transparent language, with words serving as counters for ideas 
reduced to their simplest components. 
His own practice, however, belies an impersonal speaker ad-
dressing a universal audience in a format aping geometry. As 
Gouhier has shown, Descartes authorizes an instrumental rheto-
ric necessitated by the residue of childhood prejudices, which 
retards the complete assurance of certainty that clear and dis-
tinct ideas should produce. Fumaroli has described how Des-
cartes aligned himself with Guez de Balzac to reach the emerging 
audience of honnetes gens by using French instead of Latin, first-
person narrative, and a style closer to baroque imagery than to 
the spare prose of scientific objectivity that is often considered 
his legacy. Rather than overwhelm his public with the force of his 
arguments, he modestly proposes to guide them in reenacting his 
philosophic quest. 
Postmodern critics, however, point to the rhetoricity of the 
entire enterprise. Descartes's physiology, admittedly discredited 
today, relies not on his method as a heuristic device but on the 
similes that purport to be only illustrations (Cahne 96). Even his 
acknowledged contributions to science, like the law of refraction 
or analytic geometry, cannot validate his method because they 
were discovered by more piecemeal means (Schuster 213-16). 
Indeed, revisionist critics suggest that his method is more an in-
strument of exposition than a tool of invention. Descartes's 
method, thus, suffers the same fate as the scholastic syllogism, 
which, according to Regulae X, should be transferred from phi-
losophy to rhetoric because it is capable of communicating only 
arguments that have been discovered by some other means. 
Moreover, just as the account of his development of his method 
in the Discourse on Method is largely fictional (Schuster 219), 
the metaphysical foundation of certainty he elaborated for his 
science in the cogito is paradoxical in that the impersonal subject 
it requires negates the empirical, autobiographical one that pre-
cedes it (Judovitz 108-9). Thus, far from being a mere adjuvant 
to a method that ultimately precludes it, rhetoric finds itself con-
terminous with his system's methodological and metaphysical 
core. 
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